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Notes
Cheaters, Not Criminals:
Antitrust Invalidation of Statutes Outlawing
Sports Agent Recruitment of Student Athletes
Ricardo J. Bascuas

Las Vegas businessman Raul Bey agreed in February 1995 to spend one
year in a Florida prison, pay a $2000 fine, and reimburse the state for $10,000
in investigative costs. The crime to which he pled no contest: failing to register
as a sports agent.' At the time, Florida law made being or attempting to
become the representative of a student athlete without first registering with the
state a third-degree felony punishable by a $5000 fine and five years in jail.2
According to the statute's preamble, criminalizing sports agent conduct serves
to "protect the interests of student athletes and academic institutions by
regulating the activities of athlete agents."3 The events leading to Bey's arrest,
however, suggest the law has a considerably less noble purpose and less farreaching effect.
Hoping to secure product endorsements and representation agreements
from college athletes, Bey had teamed up with Nate Cebrun, a man in the
business of referring athletes to sports agents for a commission.4 Bankrolled
by Bey, Cebrun traveled to Florida State University (FSU) in Tallahassee in
October 1993, lavishing cash on FSU players and promising them decadent
trips to Las Vegas.5 Having captured the attention of some of the Seminoles,
Cebrun returned to Las Vegas, leaving Paul Williams, a former Tallahassee
high school football coach acquainted with some FSU players, to distribute
1. "Agent" PleadsNo Contest, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Feb. 11,1995, at 2C. Bey also faced federal
charges in Las Vegas for allegedly dealing in stolen computer parts. Id.
2. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.453, 775.082, 775.083 (Harrison 1994).
3. Id. § 468.451. This preamble was preserved when the Florida legislature amended the statute in
1995. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.451 (West 1996).
4. Sonja Steptoe & E.M. Swift, Anatomy of a Scandal, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 16, 1994, at 18,
20.
5. Id. at 24-25.
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more money among those who had expressed an interest in Cebrun's
overtures.6
Cebrun returned to Florida State with Bey in November to make grander
gestures and promises. On one such trip, they passed out hundred-dollar bills
and promised a regular allowance to those who would agree to accept their
agent referrals. 7 Another incident-one that remains infamous-captured
headlines and turned the pair's recruitment campaign into a national scandal.
Apparently at Cebrun's behest, he and Bey took a group of FSU players to a
Foot Locker store just as the store was to close. With only Bey, Cebrun, and
the players behind the locked doors, the players grabbed shoes, hats, jackets,
shirts, and anything else they wanted-$6000 worth of merchandise in all. Bey
footed the bill and later treated some of the athletes to a $600 dinner.8 Shortly
thereafter, Bey and Cebrun had a falling-out, and the players lost all interest.
Bey was left with nothing to show for the $60,000 he claims to have spent on
the recruitment effort.9
To someone unfamiliar with the mores of American college sports, Bey's
plan might seem to be a sensible business strategy, though perhaps one lacking
in taste. Among followers of National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
sports, however, such actions carry a serious stigma. Universities and colleges
that belong to the NCAA must disqualify student athletes who accept gifts or
sign representation contracts with sports agents. ° The "Foot Locker scandal"
was trumpeted by the national media as representative of the corruption of
college football and the greed of agents and players." FSU athletic director
Bob Goin cast the athletes and the university as victims of "'the sleazebags
who filter onto our campus."" 2 Head coach Bobby Bowden, emphasizing his
staff's impotence to prevent gifts to players, added, "'If your daddy's running
around on his wife, she's the last one to find out. What do you expect us to
do?"'" 3 Prompted by the sensational attention being paid the incident, rival
University of Florida coach Steve Spurrier quipped that FSU "'is now known
as Free Shoes University.""..
As Bey and other would-be sports agents have learned, attempting to
recruit student athletes not only generates bad publicity, it is also illegal in
twenty-one states. This Note argues that state laws criminalizing contact
6. Id. at 20, 21, 22, 25.
7. Id. at 28.
8. Id. at 19-20, 26.
9. Id. at 20.
10. See infra note 25 and accompanying text.
11.See, e.g., Brian Hewitt, FloridaSt. Still Shopping; Seminoles Seek a Clean Image This Season,
CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 11,1994, at 141; Johnette Howard, FSU's Dirt Shouldn't Sully Bowden, WASH.
POST, May 15, 1994, at D4; S.L. Price, Victory, But Not Success, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, May 16, 1994,
at 84.
12. Steptoe & Swift, supra note 4,at 21.
13. Id.
14. Peter Kerasotis, Fla. State Troubles No Surprise to Spurrier,USA TODAY, June 10, 1994, at 3C.
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between student athletes and sports agents are invalid under the Sherman
Antitrust Act and undermine the professed goals of the NCAA. Part I describes
the structure and policies of the NCAA. Part II illustrates the prevalence and
the consequences of violations of the NCAA rule against student athletes
dealing with sport agents. Part I reviews the various state laws punishing
sports agents for trying to recruit student athletes and questions the laws'
underlying rationale. Part IV traces the interaction between federal antitrust law
and state law and examines two independent grounds on which the state laws
restricting contact between athletes and agents can be invalidated. This Note
does not argue that under the Sherman Act states lack the power to regulate
sports agents. It argues only that states may not legally criminalize the acts of
consenting adults seeking to execute mutually beneficial representation
agreements simply because they violate the rules of the NCAA.
I. THE NCAA
Like most universities competing in intercollegiate athletics, Florida State
is a member of the NCAA, which is responsible for overseeing athletic
competitions among its member institutions. As of December 1994, the NCAA
had 1152 members, 246 of which were conferences and 906 of which were
universities and colleges (member institutions).' The members are grouped
into three divisions according to the number of athletes a university fields, the
number of sports it sponsors, the number of games it plays, and the financial
aid it awards athletes.' 6 Of the member institutions, 302 (33%) were classified
as Division I; 247 (27%) comprised Division II; and 357 (39%) were in
Division HI.'7 Division I schools, such as Florida State, typically field the
most competitive teams.
The self-proclaimed "basic purpose" of the NCAA is "to maintain
intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program and the
athlete as an integral part of the student body and, by so doing, retain a clear
line of demarcation between intercollegiate athletics and professional
sports."' 8 Accordingly, it promulgates rules governing virtually all aspects of
competition among its members. The NCAA Constitution and Bylaws delineate
with great specificity the qualifications student athletes must meet to remain
eligible to compete and the requirements member institutions must fulfill to
remain in good standing. The NCAA can enforce its rules only against member
institutions. When it determines an athlete is ineligible for competition, it
15. Telephone Interview with Shawna Hutchins, NCAA Legislative Assistant (Feb. 13, 1995)
[hereinafter Hutchins].
16. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC Ass'N, 1995-96 NCAA MANUAL § 20.9-20.11. at 361-77
(1995) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL] (Operating Bylaws).
17. Hutchins, supra note 15.
18. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 1.3.1, at I (Constitution).
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directs the athlete's school to suspend him from play. Member institutions that
violate NCAA rules or directives can be fined, forced to forfeit past victories,
or have their recruiting activities curtailed.' 9 In cases of flagrant or repeated
violations, a university is subject to several stricter penalties, including a twoyear ban from competing in a sport altogether29-the so-called "death
penalty."
The NCAA rules governing student athletes are meant to ensure that only
those who meet the NCAA definition of "student athlete" compete: "An
amateur student athlete is one who engages in a particular sport for the
educational, physical, mental and social benefits derived therefrom and for
whom participation in that sport is an avocation.' Student athletes must be
enrolled full-time in a curriculum leading to a degree and must make regular
progress toward that degree. 22 They may not receive money or aid in excess
of the total cost of tuition, fees, books, room, and board from virtually any
source-including, in the case of Division I players, off-campus
employment.23 An NCAA football player who joins the National Football
League (NFL) draft irrevocably loses his amateur status and thus becomes
ineligible to compete in NCAA football, whether or not he is drafted.24 The
''no-agent rule" prohibits players from accepting money or gifts from sports
agents and from entering into representation agreements.25
Despite these rules and the NCAA's repeated assertions, several
commentators have questioned whether the revenue-producing college
26
sports-particularly football-are in any sense amateur or educational.
NCAA sports have undeniable commercial aspects and appeal. Division I
sports alone enjoyed well over $1.5 billion in revenue during the 1992-93

19. Id. § 19.6.1, at 346-47 (Operating Bylaws).
20. Id. § 19.6.2, at 347-50 (Operating Bylaws).
21. Id. § 12.02.1, at 69 (Operating Bylaws).
22. Id. § 14.1.6.2, at 134, § 14.4.3.2, at 153-54 (Operating Bylaws).
23. Id. § 15.1.1, at 184, § 15.2, at 185-91 (Operating Bylaws).
24. Id. § 12.2.4.2, at 74 (Operating Bylaws). A basketball player, however, may participate in the
National Basketball Association draft and return to college competition within 30 days. Id. § 12.2.4.2.1,
at 74 (Operating Bylaws).
25. Id. § 12.3.1, at 74 (Operating Bylaws).
26. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1099 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Page v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 93 F.2d 887, 895-97 (5th Cir. 1937) (Hutcheson, J.,
dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439 (1938); Christopher L. Chin,
Comment, Illegal Procedures: The NCAA's Unlawful Restraint of the Student-Athlete, 26 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 1213 (1993); Thomas R. Kobin, Comment, The National CollegiateAthletic Association's No Agent
and No Draft Rules: The Realities of Collegiate Sports Are Forcing Change, 4 SErON HALL J. SPoRT L.
483 (1994); Note, Sherman Act Invalidation of the NCAA Amateurism Rules, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1299
(1992) [hereinafter Sherman Act Invalidation].
Football is the most lucrative of the college sports and, although the NCAA does not keep statistics
on violations of the no-agent rule, media coverage implies that such violations most frequently occur in
that sport. Also, college baseball and basketball players are subject to a considerably more lenient no-draft
rule that allows them to ascertain their market potential in the professional arena without losing college
eligibility. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 12.2.4.2, at 74 (Operating Bylaws).
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fiscal year.27 The total revenues for all three divisions were more than $2
billion." Among the 106 member institutions with the most competitive
athletic programs-those in Division I-A-football accounted on average for
67% of the revenue from men's sports.29 "Glorified men at arms, they go
abroad, the fighting men of their universities, bringing to it, if they have been
well scouted, garnered and trained, fame, honor, and money galore. If they
have not been, no fame, no honor, and a much smaller portion of the gate
receipts. ' 30
Not only is NCAA football a prosperous industry, but it provides the only
practical forum for a football player hoping to play professionally to showcase
and develop his talent. Only two of the 1279 players on NFL team rosters at
the start of the 1994 season did not play for an NCAA institution. 31 Most of
the other players attended Division I schools, whose athletes (not surprisingly)
commit most violations of the no-agent rule. 2 One would expect, then, that
at least some athletes play NCAA football in the hope that doing so will lead
to a professional contract.
The NCAA professes that this is not, or should not be, so: "Student
athletes shall be amateurs in an intercollegiate sport, and their participation
should be motivated primarily by education and by the physical, mental and
social benefits to be derived. 33 The NCAA's emphasis on the education of
student athletes protects its amateurism and eligibility rules from legal
challenges, such as federal antitrust claims, that might otherwise result in their
nullification34 It is curious, then, that the three NCAA divisions utilize
disparate methods for gauging their athletes' scholastic ambitions. Divisions
I and II have established lax minimum academic requirements for prospective
and current student athletes. 35 Rather than ensuring that athletes competing
in these divisions have an interest in education, the requirements allow each
27. DANIEL L. FULKS, REVENUES AND EXPENSES OF INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETIC PROGRAMS 11

(1994).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 15.

30. Regents of Univ. Sys., 93 F.2d at 895 (Hutcheson, J., dissenting).
31. National Football League, NFL Rosters by College (Sept. 29, 1994) (on file with author).
32. "[A sports-agent violation) typically would involve those student athletes who have some prospect
of competing in the professional sports and probably a majority of those would come from a Division I
school." Telephone Interview with Lisa Dehon, NCAA Eligibility Representative (Feb. 13, 1995).
33. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 2.8, at 4 (Constitution).
34. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1089-90 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845
F.2d 1338, 1343-45 (5th Cir. 1988); Hairston v. Pacific-10 Conference, 893 F. Supp. 1495, 1496 (W.D.
Wash. 1995). This issue is briefly addressed in Section W.A.
35. To be eligible to compete, student athletes must have scored 700 out of a possible 1600 points on
the Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) or 17 out of a possible 35 on the American College Test (ACT), and
have achieved a 2.0 grade point average (GPA) on a 4.0 scale for 13 high school courses. NCAA MANUAL,
supra note 16, § 14.3.1.1, at 142-43, § 14.3.1.2, at 144-45 (Operating Bylaws). Beginning in the 1996-97
academic year, the test-score and GPA requirements for Division I freshmen will be determined on a sliding
scale. Students attaining only the minimum 700 SAT or 17 ACT score must have a 2.5 GPA, while
students scoring at least 900 on the SAT or 21 on the ACT will be eligible with a 2.0 GPA. Id. § 14.3.1.1,
at 144 (Operating Bylaws).
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member institution to field athletes who are not in good academic standing
under the institution's own criteria. For example, Division I athletes may
continue to play sports even if their grade point averages are below that
required by their colleges for graduation.3 6 Student athletes competing in
Divisions I and II must complete only 25% of their degree requirements after
37
two years of enrollment, 50% after three years, and 75% after four years.
(It must be merely figuratively, then, that the NCAA Manualdistinguishes only
between two-year and four-year colleges. 38 ) Division III, in contrast, does not
impose academic requirements on its athletes. Instead, these athletes are subject
to the same academic requirements as other students attending their respective
colleges. Similarly, while Division I and II members award scholarships based
solely on athletic talent, 39 Division I members do not award any financial
aid for athletic ability absent a showing of need. n"
These differing approaches indicate that Division I and II members are less
concerned than Division III institutions about their student athletes' motivations
for attending college. While Division III may have divined the best way "to
maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part -of the student body,"'" Division I
institutions have created a very high-profile, billion-dollar enterprise operating
under a different set of rules than the institutions' academic programs. As a
result, colleges that subordinate athletics to academics are viewed as exceptions
to the norm by the mass media. One report, for example, described the New
England Small College Athletic Conference (NESCAC), an NCAA Division
III conference comprising small liberal arts colleges like Amherst, Dartmouth,
and Middlebury, as playing "pure" college sports and being "above the fray"
for putting "things academic ahead of things athletic. 42 The price paid by
Division I institutions that operate their athletic and academic programs as
separate enterprises has been NCAA penalties and public reprobation when
athletes they recruit are caught violating NCAA rules.

36. Division I athletes must attain 90% of the GPA required for graduation by the third year of
enrollment and 95% of the average by the fourth year. Id. § 14.4.3.3.1, at 154-55 (Operating Bylaws).
Division II athletes are required to have a 1.6 cumulative GPA after the first season of play, a 1.8 after the
next, and a 2.0 thereafter. Id. § 14.4.3.3.2, at 155 (Operating Bylaws).
37. Id. § 14.4.3.2.2, at 154 (Operating Bylaws). The rule applies to students entering college after July
1992.
38. See, e.g., id. § 3.02.3, at 7, § 3.2.1.1, at 8 (Constitution).
39. This was not always so. From 1947 to 1952, the NCAA's "Sanity Code" allowed athletic
scholarships only to students with financial need. "The goal of the code was to stop the unbridled spending
by member institutions to recruit and retain student athletes." KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, AGENTS OF
OPPORTUNITY: SPORTS AGENTS AND CORRUPTION IN COLLEGIATE SPORTS 61 (1990).

40. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 20.11.2, at 374 (Operating Bylaws).
41. Id. § 1.3.1, at I (Constitution).
42. Douglas S. Looney, Pure and Simple, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Oct. 31, 1994, at 68, 74, 77.
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II. VIOLATIONS OF THE NO-AGENT RULE

Anticipating NCAA action once the Foot Locker scandal erupted, Florida
State suspended five athletes from play43 and hired the law firm Bond,
Schoeneck & King to investigate the alleged violations. 44 Less than one
month later, allegations surfaced that sports agent Doug Andreaus arranged for
$23,000 in loans to wide receiver Tamarick Vanover's mother.4' Bond,
Schoeneck & King's investigation, which cost FSU nearly $400,000,46
confirmed all the alleged violations and uncovered a new one: Three days
before FSU defeated the University of Nebraska in the Orange Bowl to win
the national championship, cornerback Corey Sawyer, apparently not satisfied
with the pocket money and sportswear he received from Bey, purchased a
$29,000 automobile with money provided by another agent.4 7
The firm's report, which was given to the NCAA, found that FSU coaches
and officials had no reason to know about the violations that occurred, but that
they should be more vigilant in the future.48 This finding is significant
because if any coaches or officials had known or should have known of the
violations, the NCAA could impose harsher penalties. 49 Failure to detect
obvious infractions or failure to act on known infractions would indicate a lack
of institutional control over a university's athletic program, a serious violation
of NCAA principles.50 As it turned out, the university might have spared

43. Guard Patrick McNeil was suspended for three games; tailback Tiger McMillon and All-American
linebacker Derrick Brooks were each suspended for two games; tackle Forrest Conoly was suspended
"indefinitely" pending his cooperation with investigators. Franz Lidz & Richard O'Brien, Seminole Justice,
SPORTs ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 8, 1994, at 10. Conoly ultimately missed four games. Alan Schmadtke, NCAA
to "Double-check" FSU, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Feb. 25, 1995, at BI. Guard Marcus Long was also
suspended for two games. Jack McCallum & Kelli Anderson, With Fans Like This.... SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Sept. 5, 1994, at 11.
44. Mike Fish, FSU Probe Finds Several Agent Violations, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Dec. 10, 1994, at
B-10. The NCAA's own investigation was delayed by a Florida law requiring the NCAA to observe
specific procedural requirements in conducting the investigation. The Collegiate Athletic Association
Compliance Enforcement Procedures Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 240.5339-.5349 (Harrison 1994), was ruled
unconstitutional. See NCAA v. Roberts, No. 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1994).
45. Douglas S. Looney & John Walters, Seminole Shame, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, June 6, 1994, at 34,
35. Under NCAA rules, student athletes lose their eligibility if they, their family, or their friends accept
money or other benefits not generally available to nonathletes and their family and friends. See NCAA
MANUAL, supra note 16, § 16.12.1, at 224 (Operating Bylaws).
46. Fish, supra note 44, at B-10.
47. What Was Reported and Found, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 10, 1994, at 4C. Sawyer, who was
drafted by the Cincinnati Bengals in 1994, was later charged with pejury for lying to a state attorney
investigating the scandal. Prosecutors said the charges might be reduced if Sawyer testified against his
agent. Ray Martinez, Ex-Seminole Sawyer Charged With Perjury, MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 7, 1995, at 2D.
48. "'FSU's coaches and athletics administrators must learn from this case and must make themselves
even more sensitive than they were to even the most remote signs or vague rumors of agent activity in and
around their program."' Phil Willon & Kevin Metz, Law Firm Clears FSU Officials, TAMPA TRIB., Dec.
10, 1994, Sports, at 1 (quoting Bond, Schoeneck & King's report to FSU).
49. See NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 19.01.5, at 343 (Operating Bylaws).
50. Id. § 6.01.1, at 45 (Constitution).
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itself the expense of investigating; rather than accepting the law firm's
findings, the NCAA announced it would conduct its own investigation.,
Despite the national attention it drew, the Foot Locker scandal at Florida
State is hardly an isolated incident. While estimates of the prevalence of
violations of the no-agent rule vary significantly, 52 it cannot be said that they
are uncommon. Former University of Miami player Benny Blades, for
example, divulged in 1993 that, while playing for Miami's 1987 national
championship team, he accepted between $30,000 and $40,000, some of which
he used to buy a new sports car, from agent Mel Levine. 3 The NCAA
learned in August 1995 that an agent gave $1200 to University of Southern
California (USC) wide receiver Keyshawn Johnson. 4 Two months later,
California attorney and aspiring agent Robert Troy Caron agreed to pay
$50,000 to USC and was enjoined from contact with the university's athletes
for attempting to recruit running back Shawn Walters. 5 Caron, who had
allegedly hired Walters's roommates to assist him in recruiting Walters,
accepted the penalties in a settlement agreement with USC.56 Walters was
temporarily suspended from play. 7
Later that year, the NCAA placed the University of Alabama on two
years' probation, barred the university from postseason bowl game competition,
reduced the number of athletic scholarships the university could offer, and
forced the Alabama Crimson Tide to forfeit their 1993 victories. 8 Such
severe punishment was imposed because the university failed to investigate
indications that All-American cornerback Antonio Langham had signed with
an agent, signaling to the NCAA a lack of institutional control over
athletics. 59 Langham had contracted with an agent following Alabama's
championship victory over the University of Miami Hurricanes in the 1993
Sugar Bowl, yet played all eleven games the following season before Alabama

51. Schmadtke, supra note 43, at BI.
52. See Landis Cox, Targeting Sports Agents with the Mail FraudStatute: United States v. Norby
Walters & Lloyd Bloom, 41 D.uKE L.J. 1157, 1169 n.60 (1992); McCann Gar, The Phone Callsfrom Sports
Agents to Dave, NEws & REc. (Greensboro, N.C.), June 14, 1995, at CI (estimating that 90% of football
players picked in first round of NFL draft have broken no-agent rule); Robert McG. Thomas, Illicit Pay
in Wide Use, Study Contends, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1989, at A34.
53. Randall Mell, Blades: 'Canes Paid by Agent, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 28, 1993, at Cl.
54. Danny Robbins, Tape Links SportsAgent, USC'S Johnson, AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Aug. 4, 1995,
at D3.
55. Mark Asher, Identifying Secret Agents: NCAA, Colleges Begin to Crack Down on Payments,
WASH. POST, Oct. 21, 1995, at BI.
56. Id.
57. Elliott Almond, Trojans' Walters Gets Reprieve From NCAA, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1995, at CI.
58. Jere Longman, The NCAA Eases Penaltiesfor Alabama's Football Team, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1,
1995, at B17.
59. J.C. Clemons, Bama Still Reluctant to Face Up to Misdeeds, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Aug. 6, 1995,
at Fl. In addition, the university made misleading reports to the NCAA. Ivan Maisel, Alabama's Probation
Serves as Warning to All, SPORTING NEWS, Aug. 14, 1995, at 51. Another player, Gary Jelks, had also
received loans from an agent. Alabama Admits to Violations, TAMPA TRIB., Nov. 23, 1994, Sports, at 1.
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Bond,

Schoeneck & King billed Alabama $500,000.)
While published accounts relating violations of the no-agent rule
abound,62 the story of Norby Walters and Lloyd Bloom remains the most
notorious sports agent scandal involving NCAA athletes. Walters, formerly a
booking agent for such entertainers as Janet Jackson, Kool and the Gang, and
Patti LaBelle, 3 formed World Sports & Entertainment, Inc. (WSE) with
Bloom in 1984 to sign as many future NFL draft picks as possible. 64 A
prospective client was typically offered a lump sum ranging from $2500 to
$4000 and a $250 monthly allowance.65 Other perks included airline and
concert tickets, clothing, and even automobiles.66 An estimated $800,000
later,67 fifty-eight student athletes had signed postdated contracts with Walters
69
and Bloom. 68 Partly because of the pair's rumored ties to organized crime,

all but two of these players signed with other agents before beginning
70
professional careers and refused to reimburse Walters and Bloom.

Walters sued some of his former clients for breaching their agreements and
began revealing his dealings with the players to the media. 7' As details of
Walters and Bloom's methods came to light, the pair's self-defeating antics
captured the attention of law enforcement officials. The violent slashing and
beating of sports agent Kathe Clements, who worked for an agency that signed
three of WSE's former clients, prompted an FBI investigation.72 Walters and
Bloom allegedly had threatened Clements prior to the assault and also had

60. See Mike Fish, Bama, NCAA to Work Out Penalty, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Nov. 23, 1994, at El;
Longman, supra note 58, at B18.
61. Clemons, supra note 59, at Fl.
62. In addition to the accounts related in this part, see, e.g., Vahe Gregorian, Report Says Middleman
Sent Cash to MU'S Crudup, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 8, 1994, at IC (involving University of
Missouri's Jevon Crudup); Bruce Hooley, OSU's Galloway Suspended, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Sept.
8. 1994, at ID (involving Ohio State University's Joey Galloway); Huskies Investigate Loan of Car to
Bryant, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 19, 1992, at C6 (involving University of Washington's Beno Bryant); Eric Olson,
Phillips' ReporIs Completed, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, Aug. 11, 1995, Sports, at 27 (involving University
of Nebraska's Lawrence Phillips); Bruce Pascoe, Cavagnaro Decides Stewart Won't Play, LAS VEGAS
REV.-J., June 21, 1995, at IE (involving University of Nevada at Las Vegas's Kebu Stewart); Ann-Eve
Pedersen, UA Denies Gifts Violated Rules on Agents, Mar. 16, 1995, ARIz. DAILY STAR, at IA (involving
plane ticket bought for father of University of Arizona's Damon Stoudamire); John Romano, Agents
Sentenced; They Still May Be Liable to UF, ST. PETERSBuRG TIMES, May 12, 1990, at IC (involving
several University of Florida athletes); ShacklefordAdmits Taking Money at N.C. State, WASH. POST, Feb.
26, 1990, at B2 (involving North Carolina State University's Charles Shackleford).
63. Craig Neff, Agents of Turmoil, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 3, 1987, at 34, 36.
64. Cox, supra note 52, at 1162.
65. Id. at 1164.
66. Id.
67. Neff, supra note 63, at 34.
68. United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1221 (7th Cir. 1993).
69. Cox, supra note 52, at 1166.
70. Walters, 997 F.2d at 1221.
71. Neff, supra note 63, at 34.
72. Cox, supra note 52, at 1167 n.55.
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threatened to break the knees and hands of players who breached their
contracts.73
The Department of Justice charged Walters and Bloom with conspiracy,
racketeering, and mail fraud.74 A jury convicted the agents, but the court of
appeals reversed the judgment 75 and ordered that Walters and Bloom be
retried separately.7 6 After entering into a conditional plea agreement with the
government, Walters faced only the mail fraud charge, of which he was
eventually acquitted by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.77 The
prosecution had proceeded on the theory that, by signing college athletes to
representation contracts, Walters had caused their universities to mail
fraudulent forms verifying the athletes' eligibility to a college football
conference. 78 The court refused to hold that "all frauds involving big
organizations necessarily are mail frauds, because big organizations habitually
mail things. ' 79 Bloom was shot to death in his Malibu home on August 26,
1993.80
Some of the beneficiaries of Walters's flamboyant recruiting methods, like
University of Tennessee wide receiver Tim McGee, who said he took $3500
from Walters, had been hard-pressed for cash: "'I had to take money from
Norby. There were bills to be paid. My mom ain't working. I have no dad. I
have two nieces and two sisters to support. Norby took me from rags to riches
in one day.'' Others simply used the money to live in grand style. Clemson
University running back Ronnie Harmon admitted he accepted over $54,000
from Walters, including a $25,000 down payment on a leased Mercedes-Benz:
"'That's not so much money. What's that, $27,000 a year? I had living
expenses-an apartment and a car.', 82 None, however, expressed any
misgivings about his decision to take the money. "'We all know that you take
money from these guys but you don't have to go with them in the end,"' said
University of Texas tight end William Harris, who took $6000 from Walters.
"'Take all the money he's going to offer and just quit him when there's no
more.' . . . 'Older players will tell you: Take money from agents, alumni,
anybody who will give it to you; take all the money they'll give you. 7'83

73. Neff, supra note 63, at 34-35.
74. For a detailed account of the trial, see Cox, supra note 52, at 1160-90.
75. See United States v. Walters, 913 F.2d 388, 391-92 (7th Cir. 1990).
76. See id. at 393.
77. See United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1227 (7th Cir. 1993) ("Walters is by all accounts a
nasty and untrustworthy fellow, but the prosecutor did not prove that his efforts to circumvent the NCAA's
rules amounted to mail fraud.").
78. Id. at 1221.
79. Id. at 1223.
80. Ex-Agent Lloyd Bloom Found Dead in Malibu, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 27, 1993, at C14.
81. Neff, supra note 63, at 39-40.
82. Id. at 36.
83. Id. at 42.
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The FSU players involved in the Foot Locker scandal echoed this lack of
remorse, making clear that the Florida statute prohibiting Bey's conduct
protects anything but their interests. "'I got a few baseball caps, some shirts,
socks, shoes and two jackets. I saw the other guys grabbing things, and I said
to myself, hey, I might as well go ahead and pick up a few things, too,"' FSU
offensive tackle Marvin Ferrell said. "'I knew it was illegal. I can't say why
I did it."'" Corey Sawyer added, "'At Florida State you work so hard to give
to that program and get nothing out of it. The most you can get out of it is a
trip to the NFL. I felt I was entitled to money or clothing. Why couldn't I
'8 5
have it?
III. THE RESPONSE OF STATE LEGISLATURES
Violations of the no-agent rule and the attendant penalties and scandals
have provoked action by state legislatures, including Florida's. Six people were
arrested and charged with violations of Florida's sports agent law as a result
of the Foot Locker scandal.8 6 Bey's agreement to pay $12,000 and spend one
year in jail represents the stiffest criminal penalty ever imposed for so-called
sports agent "misconduct" in any state. Cebrun and Williams each pleaded no
contest, paid a fine, and served less than thirty days' jail time. 7 Andreaus
was fined and placed on probation."
Following the scandal, the Florida legislature amended its sports agent law.
Florida is now the only state to test prospective agents' knowledge of the law
and to impose continuing-education requirements.8 9 Twenty-one other
states-Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Washington-also have legislation regulating sports agents. Most require
agents to be registered with or licensed by the state. 90 Failure to do so can
render any representation contract made with a student athlete in that state

84. Steptoe & Swift, supra note 4, at 26.
85. Id. at 21-22.
86. Jim Henry, FootLocker Issues Continuefor FSU,TAMPA TRIB., June 27, 1995, Sports, at 3; Alan
Schmadtke, Arrest Surfaces in Probe of FSU, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Sept. 8, 1995, at C7.
87. Bey Charged in FSUProbe, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 7, 1995, at B2.
88. Schmadtke, supra note 43, at B1.
89. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.453(2)(c), 468.4563 (Vest 1996). Members of the Florida bar are
exempt from the examination requirement. Id. § 468.453(3).
90. See ALA. CODE § 8-26-4 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-48-201(a) (Michie 1992); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1510 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.453 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-4 (1994);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.3.1 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:422.A (Vest Supp. 1995); MD. CODE
ANN., BUS. REG. § 4-407 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-3 (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-72(b)(5)
(1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.62.C (West 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-20(A) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 2(a) (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 18.175.020 (West Supp. 1995).
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void 9 or result in a forfeiture of the right to repayment for any loans made
to a prospective client.9" Maximum civil penalties range from $1000 to
$100,000, and six states provide for maximum jail terms ranging from one to
five years. 93
Registration or licensure is, of course, a prerequisite for engaging in any
number of professions, from practicing medicine to cutting hair, and while the
expense and trouble incident to registering have been criticized,94 the
requirement cannot be said to be exceptional. Unlike doctors and stylists who
are free to practice their professions on whoever will submit to their treatment,
properly registered sports agents can face criminal penalties in each of the
states with sports agent laws, save Arkansas, for dealing with student athletes.
The statutes (hereinafter described as contact-restricting) of these twenty-one
states vary in their exigency. Indiana's requires only that an agent, after
entering into a contract with a student athlete, notify the athlete's university. 95
Kentucky's and Michigan's laws prohibit agents only from offering student
athletes anything of value to induce them to enter into a contract and from
paying university employees for client referrals.96 Fourteen other states also
forbid giving student athletes inducements to sign contracts,97 and fifteen
other states have outlawed compensating university employees for referring
clients.98 California goes one step further by also prohibiting students from
91. See ALA. CODE § 8-26-40 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-48-102(b) (Michie 1992); CAL. LAB.
CODE § 1546 (West 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.454(7) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-1 I(b)
(1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.10 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:426.B (West Supp. 1995); MD.
CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4404 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15(3) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C78(b) (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.66.B (West 1989); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871,
§ 8(b) (West Supp. 1996).
92. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-48-102(a) (Michie 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.10 (West 1995); LA.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:426.B (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-424(2) (1992); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 73-41-15(2)(a) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-78(a)(1) (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70,
§ 821.66.A.2 (West 1989); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(a)(2) (West Supp. 1996).
93. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.4561 (West 1996); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 775.082-.083 (West 1995);
GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-11(a) (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.11 (West 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus.
REG. § 4-425 (1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15(1)(e) (1995); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-78(c), 15A1340.17 (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.66.C (West 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-20(C)
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8(c) (West Supp. 1996); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. § 12.21 (West 1993).
94. See, e.g., David L. Dunn, Note, Regulation of Sports Agents: Since At FirstIt Hasn't Succeeded,
Try FederalLegislation, 39 HASTINGS LJ. 1031, 1066 (1988).
95. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-4644 (West 1994).
96. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 518.080 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 750.411e(1) (West 1995).
97. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67360 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.456(1)(f) (West 1996); GA.
CODE ANN. § 43-4A-16(b) (1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.8.3 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 4:424.A(7), (8) (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-421 (1992); MISS. CODE ANN. § 7341-11(g) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.920.1(d) (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-76(b)(4)
(1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64.7 (West 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(a)(2) (Supp.
1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-40(4) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8871,
§ 6(b)(4) (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.175.070(2) (West Supp. 1995).
98. See ALA. CODE § 8-26-34 (1993); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1539 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 468.456(1)(e) (West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.8.5 (West 1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:424.A(6)
(West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., BUS. REG. § 4-419 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.4 (West

1996]

Cheaters, Not Criminals

1615

accepting gifts from agents. 99 Two states make it illegal for agents to enter
into representation agreements with student athletes,'00 and six others simply
forbid agents to have any contact whatsoever (other than that permitted by the
NCAA 0 1 ) with students who are eligible to play intercollegiate sports. 2
If a student athlete does manage to sign a sports agent contract despite the
above-mentioned prohibitions, ten states in addition to Indiana require the
agent (and in some cases the student athlete as well) to send notice of the
contract to the state or to the student's university.10 3
Though there are variations in the methods employed, the aim of each
contact-restricting statute is the same: to remove any incentive for a sports
agent to deal with a student athlete by criminalizing such behavior. Maximum
civil penalties for violating a contact-restricting statute range from $10,000 to
the greater of $100,000 or three times the amount offered or promised to an
athlete, and jail sentences can be as long as five years."° Furthermore,
universities in eight states can sue an agent for revenue lost as a result of being
forced to declare a student ineligible or of being penalized for a violation of
the no-agent rule by the NCAA; in three states, the student athlete can be sued

1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-11(f) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 597.920.1(c) (Michie 1994); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 78C-76(b)(3) (1995); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.64.6 (Vest 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 7107(a)(3) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-40(2), (3) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TEX.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(3) (,Vest Supp. 1996); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 18.175.070(I)(b)
(West Supp. 1995).
99. See CAL- EDUC. CODE § 67361(a) (vest 1989). The maximum penalty is the greater of a $1000
fine or a fine equal to the value of the gift accepted. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67361(c) (WVest 1994).
100. See MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-11(g) (1995); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7107(a)(1) (Supp.
1995).
101. NCAA member institutions can organize a "sports counseling panel" comprising only full-time
university employees. The panel may interview prospective agents with student athletes and advise the
students on career decisions. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 12.3.4, at 75.
102. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.456(1)(1) (Vest 1996); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:424.A(9) (West
Supp. 1995); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-423 (1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 78C-76(b)(5) (1995); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §§ 821.62.A, 821.64.8 (Vest 1989); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 6(b)(5)
(West Supp. 1996).
103. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.454(1) (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-16(a)(2) (1994); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4(2) (Vest 1994); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:423.E (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE
ANN., BUS. REG. § 4-415(a)(1) (1992); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 398.095.3 (Michie 1991); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 78C-75(c) (1995); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 4771.02(B) (Anderson 1994); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59102-30(A), 03) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2104(b)(4) (1990); TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 5(c) (West Supp. 1996). A twelfth state allows a student athlete to void any agent
contract made prior to his sending a "waiver of eligibility" form to the state or to his university's athletic
director. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.33.2 (vest 1995).
104. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67360(d) (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.454(1) (West 1996); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-46-4-4(2) (West 1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A. I (West 1995); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 518.080(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1994); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 4:426.C (West Supp. 1995); MD. CODE
ANN., Bus. REG. § 4-425 (1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.41 le(2) (West 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 325E.33.3(2), 325E.33.4(2) (West 1995); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-41-15(1)(e) (1995); NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 597.920.2 (Michie 1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 78C-78(c), 78C-79(a) (1995); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 4771.05(B) (Anderson 1994); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 821.66.C (West 1989); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 7107(b) (Supp. 1995); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(B) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TEx.
REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, §§ 8(a)(1), 9(b) (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 18.175.070 (Vest Supp. 1995).
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for damages as well. 0 5 Such damages can easily run into the millions of
dollars when broadcast revenues are considered. The deliberately intended and
desired effect of the laws is to remove any opportunity for a student athlete to
violate the NCAA no-agent rule.
These laws proceed from two popular misconceptions regarding sports
agent dealings with student athletes. The first, that student athletes are
somehow tricked into signing representation agreements by shady agents, is
directly contradicted by the statements of players who have broken the noagent rule. 1°6 While the agents involved may in fact have been shady, if not
something worse, there is no question that these athletes understood the
ramifications of their actions and that at least some of them intended to exploit
the perception that they are victims by double-crossing the agents. (It was
exactly this behavior that provoked Norby Walters to sue his former clients
and to reveal his scheme to the press.)
Because general contract law principles protect against agreements induced
by fraud or coercion, the view of athletes as victims of agents more likely
stems from the premise that athletes do not know any better than to go along
with what agents tell them. If that is the case, universities have a duty to
prepare their athletes for professional sports dealings. Some universities, such
as Duke and Temple, have established career-counseling programs that go
beyond the NCAA's suggestion of a counseling panel. 0 7 They extensively
educate athletes on how to deal with sports agents, how to negotiate favorable
terms, what actions constitute violations of NCAA rules, and how best to
launch successful athletic careers. Dr. Michael Jackson, the director of
Temple's program, also maintains a database of agents with whom he has dealt
and assists players ready to become professional athletes in their contract
negotiations. The programs are solely for the protection of the athletes. "We
don't want them to get ripped off," said Dr. Jackson. "It's probably the best
way of deterring the exploitation of players."' 08
The second misconception underlying the statutes is that universities,
besieged by sports agents who seduce their student athletes, are helpless to do
anything about the problem. Because NCAA members have complete control
collectively over intercollegiate sports and individually over their own
admissions decisions, it is illogical to view them as victims of sports agents.
They are always free either to change the rules or to deny admission to athletes
primarily interested in professional sports. Furthermore, criminalizing the acts
105. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 468.456(6), 468.4562 (West 1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 43-4A-16(c)
(1994); IOWA CODE ANN. § 9A.6.1 (West 1995); Miss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-23 (1995); NEv. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 398.085 (Michie 1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-102-30(F) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 49-7-2103, 49-7-2106, 49-7-2107 (1990); Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 8A(a) (West

Supp. 1996).
106. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 101.
108. Telephone Interview with Dr. Michael Jackson, Temple Univ. (Feb. 13, 1995).
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of sports agents is antagonistic to the NCAA's philosophy and rules. NCAA
rules exist not to prevent student athletes or sports agents from doing whatever
they believe to be in their best interest, but to prevent universities from
recruiting and retaining athletes who have no interest in a college education.
The only deterrent to member institutions' recruiting such athletes is the
likelihood that those athletes will break the rules and thereby expose the
members to the threat of NCAA penalties. Eliminating agents from the picture
with criminal penalties minimizes the possibility that athletes will be able to
cheat. The statutes thus serve only to encourage NCAA members to recruit
those athletes who make their teams most competitive without regard for their
duties as NCAA members.
As Division III members demonstrate, truly amateur intercollegiate
competition among student athletes can be achieved without resort to criminal
prosecutions. While the popularity and revenues of NCAA Division I football
would likely be diminished if it adopted policies similar to Division Il's, that
is no argument against the attainability of the NCAA's "basic purpose." It is
safe to assume that, were all of college football truly amateur, the NFL would
not be long in replacing its de facto minor league with a truly professional
minor league. The interests of those players who have indicated their
dissatisfaction with the present arrangement by cheating on the rules would be
better served by the opportunity to play in such a league.
IV. APPLICATION OF FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW
While several commentators have suggested that the NCAA eligibility
rules violate the Sherman Act because they impede athletes in marketing their
skills outside of the NCAA,' 0 9 the invalidity of the contact-restricting statutes
under the Act has been overlooked. Those commenting on laws regulating
sports agents have proposed other problematic ways to reduce violations of the
no-agent rule through criminal penalties, such as the enactment of uniform
contact-restricting laws in every state"' and the enactment of a federal
contact-restricting statute." ' Federal legislation in this area would be the
worst possible result, however, because it would create an enduring
anticompetitive structure extremely disadvantageous to those aspiring to careers
as professional athletes. Such a statute could only be attacked on constitutional
grounds or through the political process. Universities tempted to recruit athletes
who are not quite students could not ask for better protection from NCAA
109. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 26; Kobin, supra note 26; Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 26.
But see Note, Tackling IntercollegiateAthletics: An Antitrust Analysis, 87 YALE L.J. 655 (1978).
110. See, e.g., T. Andrew Dow, Comment, Out of Bounds: Time to Revamp Texas Sports Agent
Legislation, 43 Sw. LJ. 1091, 1104-14 (1990); Curtis D. Rympa, Note, Sports Agents Representing
Athletes: The Need for Comprehensive State Legislation, 24 VAL. U. L. REv. 481, 510-19 (1990).
!11. See, e.g., Dow, supra note 110, at 1114-18; Dunn, supra note 94, at 1064-78.
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penalties. As this part demonstrates, the existing contact-restricting statutes are
susceptible to Sherman Act invalidation. Section A of this part briefly explains
why, despite arguments to the contrary, the NCAA amateurism and eligibility
rules have rightly withstood federal antitrust challenges. Section B traces the
development of the state action immunity doctrine, which shields certain state
legislation from antitrust attack, and shows that the contact-restricting statutes
are an unlawful exercise of the states' power in light of the relevant case law.
A. Antitrust Challenges to NCAA Rules
The Sherman Act outlaws all combinations that unreasonably restrain
interstate trade or commerce 12 as well as all attempts to monopolize an
interstate commodity." 3 Passed pursuant to Congress's constitutional power
to regulate interstate commerce," 4 the Act reflects a congressional
determination that, as a matter of public policy, competition is the favored
means for distributing goods in the national economy. "Antitrust laws in
general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of free
enterprise. They are as important to the preservation of economic freedom and
our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms."' 5 It is well settled that the Act expresses
the full measure of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause" 6 and that
the scope of the Act conforms to changing judicial interpretations of that
power." 7 Certain business practices, such as price fixing among
competitors," 8 territorial divisions of markets among competitors," 9 and
group boycotts, 20 are deemed unlawful per se under the Act. Other practices

112.

Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is
declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or engage in any
combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of
a felony ....

15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994); see also Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-43 (1982);
Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918) ("Every agreement concerning trade,
every regulation of trade, restrains ....The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such
as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or
even destroy competition.").
113. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony ... " 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1994).
114. "The Congress shall have Power ...To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among
the several States, and with the Indian Tribes ... "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,cls. 1, 3.
115. United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972).
116. United States v. South-Eastem Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 558 (1944); Atlantic Cleaners
& Dyers Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932).
117. See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 743 n.2 (1976).
118. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
119. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified and af'd,
175 U.S. 211 (1899).
120. See Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
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are evaluated according to the "Rule of Reason" approach, which entails
examining market conditions and weighing the anticompetitive and
procompetitive effects of the challenged practice to determine whether it
2
unreasonably restricts competition.1 '
No one contends that the NCAA is not a cartel that restrains interstate
commerce. To be sure, the Supreme Court has held that it is.' Federal
courts considering the legality of NCAA rules under the Sherman Act,
however, have consistently held that the rules do not violate the Act because
they do not unreasonably restrain commerce. Most of these courts have
undertook a Rule of Reason analysis and concluded that the NCAA rules are,
on balance, procompetitive because without them, intercollegiate athletics
would not exist."z The Supreme Court lent support to this rationale in dicta:
[T]he NCAA seeks to market a particular brand of football-college
football. The identification of this "product" with an academic
tradition differentiates college football from and makes it more
popular than professional sports to which it might otherwise be
comparable, such as, for example, minor league baseball. In order to
preserve the character and quality of the "product," athletes must not
be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like. And the
integrity of the "product" cannot be preserved except by mutual
agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its
effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon be
destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college
football to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to
be marketed which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this
role, its actions widen consumer choice-not only the choices
available to sports fans but also those available to athletes-and hence
can be viewed as procompetitive.' 2 4
In fact, the NCAA's power to enforce its rules has survived attacks
brought under a panoply of legal arguments by virtually every party with any
conceivable stake in intercollegiate sports. Plaintiffs have included NCAA
members,125 student athletes, 2 6 coaches, 2 7 team managers, 2 8 university

121. See, e.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 24 (1979); Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57 (1977).
122. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 99, 117 (1984); see also NCAA
v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988) (characterizing NCAA as "private monopolist").
123. See, e.g., Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1090 (7th Cir. 1992); McCormack v. NCAA, 845 E2d
1338, 1344-45 (5th Cir. 1988); Gaines v. NCAA, 746 F. Supp. 738, 746 (M.D. Tenn. 1990); Justice v.
NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 382 (D. Ariz. 1983).
124. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okia., 468 U.S. at 101-02 (footnote omitted).
125. See Colorado Seminary (Univ. of Denver) v. NCAA, 570 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. NCAA, 560 F.2d 352 (8th Cir. 1977).
126. See Banks, 977 F.2d 1081; McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338; Jones v. Wichita State Univ., 698 F2d
1082 (10th Cir. 1983); Parish v. NCAA, 506 F.2d 1028 (5th Cir. 1975); Hairston v. Pacific-10 Conference,
833 F. Supp. 1495 (W.D. Wash. 1995); Collier v. NCAA, 783 E Supp. 1576 (D.R.I. 1992); Gaines, 746
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alumni, 129 players' parents, 130 and even cheerleaders.' 3' They have come
to court claiming the NCAA has violated §§ 1132 and 21' of the Sherman
Act; impinged on constitutional guarantees to due process' 34 and equal
protection; 35 prevented the exercise of First Amendment rights to freedom
of expression 36 and freedom of association; 37 breached or interfered with
contractual obligations; 38 infringed the right to be free from punishment
absent personal guilt 139 and the right of a parent to rear his child; 40 and
broken state law. 14 ' And they have all lost. The NCAA rules and their
enforcement appear to be entirely legal. Indeed, the Tenth Circuit, evidently
weary of hearing such cases, has stated: "'[T]his court has consistently found
that, unless clearly defined constitutional principles are at issue, the suits of
student-athletes displeased with high school athletic
associations or NCAA
' 42
rules do not present substantial federal questions.""
Those who claim the NCAA rules restrain the ability of athletes to market
their skills criticize the federal court decisions upholding NCAA rules in
Sherman Act cases and have gone so far as to accuse the federal bench of
ignorant if not obsequious deference to the NCAA1 43 These commentators,
however, focus only on the apparent inequities the rules impose on student
athletes of potentially professional caliber while ignoring the benefits the rules
F. Supp. 738; Hawkins v. NCAA, 652 F Supp. 602 (C.D. Ill. 1987); Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356; Jones v.
NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1975).
127. See Tarkanian,488 U.S. 179.
128. See Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. 602.
129. See McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338.
130. See Karmanos v. Baker, 816 F.2d 258 (6th Cir. 1987).
131. See McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338.
132. See Banks, 977 F.2d 1081; McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338; Hairston, 833 F. Supp. 1495; Justice,
577 F. Supp. 356; Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295.
133. See Gaines, 746 F. Supp. 738; Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295.
134. See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179; McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338; Colorado Seminary, 570 F.2d 320;
Regents of Univ. of Minn., 560 F.2d 352; Parish,506 F.2d 1028; Collier,783 F. Supp. 1576; Hawkins, 652
F. Supp. 602; Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356; Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295.
135. See Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d 1082; Colorado Seminary, 570 F.2d 320; Parish, 506 F.2d
1028; Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. 602; Jones, 392 F. Supp. 295.
136. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356.
137. See McCormack, 845 F.2d 1338; Karmanos, 816 F.2d 258.
138. See Collier,783 F. Supp. 1576; Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. 602.
139. See Justice, 577 F. Supp. 356.
140. See Karmanos, 816 F.2d 258.
141. See Hawkins, 652 F. Supp. 602.
142. See Wichita State Univ., 698 F.2d at 1085 (quoting Wiley v. NCAA, 612 F.2d 473, 477 (10th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 943 (1980)).
143. See, e.g., Chin, supra note 26, at 1230 ("[W]hile courts have applied antitrust laws to the
NCAA's regulations, they have traditionally been very lenient .... The modem trend in antitrust litigation
is that while courts recognize the NCAA's actions in commercial markets, they still defer to the stated goal
of intercollegiate athletics as a part of the educational system."); Kobin, supra note 26, at 523 ("In order
to protect its rules from antitrust attack, the NCAA claims the rules preserve amateurism rather [than]
generate profit. While courts generally agree with this argument, they are obviously closing their eyes to
reality.... Any objective observation without deference to the NCAA would reach a different conclusion."
(footnote omitted)); Sherman Act Invalidation, supra note 26, at 1304 ("[C]ourts have failed to
acknowledge the distinction between the ideal of amateurism and the reality of college athletics.").
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provide the vast majority of NCAA athletes.'" When all three divisions are
taken into account, it is reasonable to conclude that even most college football
players are truly amateur student athletes, to say nothing of the men and
women involved in other NCAA sports. During the 1991-92 season, 45,579
student athletes played NCAA football at 530 member institutions. 145 Last
year, NFL teams drafted a total of 249 players. 46 Because the NCAA
provides an intercollegiate forum for amateur athletic competition that would
not otherwise exist, courts have correctly decided that the NCAA rules do not
unreasonably restrain trade.
The numerous violations of the no-agent rule, the various lawsuits filed
against the NCAA, and the remorselessness of the players who break the rules
imply only that some member institutions are ignoring their obligations to the
NCAA by fielding "student athletes" who, despite arguably fulfilling every
other requirement of amateurism and eligibility detailed in the NCAA Bylaws,
fail to meet the definition of the term. Presumably universities do this because
they expect winning games will generate goodwill and other benefits. 147 That
some members engage in such conduct does not by itself turn the NCAA into
a cartel unreasonably restraining commerce. As one court has observed, "That
the NCAA has not distilled amateurism to its purest form does not mean its
a mixture containing some amateur elements are
attempts to maintain
148
unreasonable."'
B. InvalidatingState Enforcement of the No-Agent Rule
While § 1 of the Sherman Act says nothing about what states can or
cannot do, under the Supremacy Clause and the judicial doctrine of
preemption, states may not pass laws that are inconsistent with the Act's

144. Sports agents are necessarily interested in only those players who will turn professional. See
supra note 32.
145. NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, THE SPORTS AND RECREATIONAL PROGRAMS OF THE
NATION'S UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES 7 (July 1994).

146. Gordon Forbes, Selection PatternShows Many Teams Face ime of Need, USA TODAY, Apr. 25,
1995, at IIC.
147. There is some controversy over whether a successful athletic program benefits a university. See,
e.g., John Dorschner, Hip-Hip-Hypocrisy!, MIAMI HERALD, July 16, 1989, Tropic Magazine, at 8. The
debate is not new:
[Tihere is no difference of informed, academic, as opposed to legalistic opinion anywhere, upon
the proposition that intercollegiate games in themselves are not part of higher education, and
that it is only by dint of the greatest struggles and precautions, on the part of the various
conferences which govern these football games, directed toward maintaining scholastic standing
and preventing professionalism in too aggravated a form, that they are conducted without great
injury to the cause of higher education. But we know, too, that it is thought by many that, so
managed and conducted, the money and athletic prestige gained for particular colleges by
outstanding teams make the games worth the candle.
Page v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 93 F.2d 887, 896 (5th Cir. 1937) (Hutcheson, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom.
Allen v. Regents of Univ. Sys., 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
148. McCormack v. NCAA, 845 F.2d 1338, 1345 (5th Cir. 1988).
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proscription of combinations in restraint of interstate commerce. 149 Unilateral
commercial regulation undertaken by a state, such as the licensing of
professionals, poses no conflict with the Act because the requisite element of
a contract, combination, or conspiracy under § 1 or of an attempt to
monopolize under § 2 is lacking. 50 If, however, a state regulation restrains
trade by approving or enforcing private action, an inquiry must be made to
determine whether the regulation is within the powers reserved to the states by
the Constitution or the regulation is preempted by the Act.
1. State Action Immunity Doctrine
The judicial doctrine acknowledging the power of the states to regulate
their economies through anticompetitive measures despite federal antitrust
legislation is sometimes called the "state action exemption."'' This is a
misnomer: Exemptions from federal antitrust laws can only be granted by
congressional legislation. 52 What the Supreme Court has decided is that the
Sherman Act simply does not apply to the states' regulation of commerce
within their borders pursuant to their sovereign authority. This basic tenet of
federalism was recognized by the Court in Parker v. Brown. 53 The Parker
149. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof ...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby,
any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2.
150. See Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904).
151. See, e.g., 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 337 (1987); Town of Hallie v. City of Eau
Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 36 (1985); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 357 (1977); Goldfarb v. Virginia State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 780 (1975).
152. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1994), was passed in 1945
to exempt the business of insurance from federal antitrust laws.
153. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). Although the doctrine is most often associated with Parker,Olsen v. Smith,
195 U.S. 332 (1904), was actually the first Supreme Court case to recognize state action immunity. At issue
was the legality of a Texas law requiring marine pilots to be licensed by the state and establishing the
maximum rates they could charge. Smith and several other pilots sued to enjoin Olsen, who did not have
a license, from continuing to offer his services. In his defense, Olsen claimed that under the Commerce
Clause, Texas was without power to regulate pilotage, that every competent pilot had a Fourteenth
Amendment right to pursue that career, and that the statute conferred a monopoly on licensed pilots in
violation of the Sherman Act. The Court first reiterated the long-settled rule that states were free to regulate
pilotage until Congress exercised its authority to do so. Id. at 341. Given the state's power to regulate the
profession, there could logically be no right to pursue pilotage despite the Texas statute. Id. at 344. Finally,
the Court held:
[I]f the State has the power to regulate, and in so doing to appoint and commission, those who
are to perform pilotage services, it must follow that no monopoly or combination in a legal
sense can arise from the fact that the duly authorized agents of the State are alone allowed to
perform the duties devolving upon them by law.
Id. at 345.
The first state action immunity case in the lower federal courts was Lowenstein v. Evans, 69 F. 908
(C.C.D.S.C. 1895), which held that a statute giving South Carolina an exclusive monopoly over the sale
and distribution of liquor within the state did not violate the Sherman Act: "[B]y this act the state makes
no contract, enters into no combination or conspiracy. She declares and asserts in herself the monopoly in
the purchase and sale of liquors." Id. at 911.
Parker cites both Olsen and Lowenstein. See 317 U.S. at 352.
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case concerned a challenge to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, a law
passed to stabilize the prices of crops and produce in California by restricting
competition among producers and distributors. A raisin grower sued to enjoin
enforcement of the state's raisin-marketing program, alleging it was invalid
under the Sherman Act. The Court held that it was not: "We find nothing in
the language of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that its
purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from activities directed
by its legislature."' 5 4 Because the Act was not intended to reach state action,
the doctrine 5is
more precisely referred to as "state action immunity" or "Parker
' 5
immunity.'
Resolving the semantic issue is not mere trifling: "Exemption" implies
someone is letting the states off the hook while "immunity" indicates no one
was fishing for them in the first place. Parker does not say that states are at
liberty to pass whatever laws they desire without any consideration for the
preservation of competition in the national economy. It simply says that some
state action, while anticompetitive in its effect, does not implicate the Sherman
Act. Crucial to the holding in Parker was the fact that California had acted
unilaterally in imposing the marketing restraints: "The state in adopting and
enforcing the prorate program made no contract or agreement and entered into
no conspiracy in restraint of trade or to establish monopoly but, as sovereign,
imposed the restraint as an act of government which the Sherman Act did not
undertake to prohibit."'' 5 6 The Court explicitly noted that states cannot
immunize private action that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws and left
undecided the question of whether states may participate in a conspiracy
among private actors:
[A] state does not give immunity to those who violate the Sherman
Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring that their action
is lawful, Northern Securities Co. v. United States; and we have no
question of the state or its municipality becoming a participant in a
private agreement or combination by others
for restraint of trade, cf
57
Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States.
This passage and the cases cited in it illuminate two analytical avenues for
testing the validity of state laws under the Sherman Act, each leading to the
conclusion that laws restricting sports agent contact with student athletes are
invalid.
154. Parker,317 U.S. at 350-51.
155. "The word 'exemption' is commonly used by courts as a shorthand expression for Parker's
holding that the Sherman Act was not intended by Congress to prohibit the anticompetitive restraints
imposed by California in that case." City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 393
n.8 (1978); see also California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06
(1980); Capital Tel. Co. v. New York Tel. Co., 750 F.2d !154, 1157-58 (2d Cir. 1984).
156. 317 U.S. at 352 (citing Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 344-45 (1904)).
157. Id. at 351-52 (citations omitted).
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The first route is to apply the current Supreme Court test as developed by
Parker'sprogeny for determining whether a particular regulation satisfies the
state action immunity criteria or is instead an attempt to protect illegal private
conduct. Northern Securities Co. v. United States 58 illustrates why making
this determination is imperative to enforcing the antitrust laws. The Northern
Securities Company was a holding company organized in New Jersey by James
J. Hill and J.P. Morgan to merge their competing railroads. The United States
alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act and sued to dissolve the merger.
The defendants argued inter alia that, because the Northern Securities
Company's conduct, though arguably anticompetitive, was not inconsistent
with its New Jersey charter, enforcing the Sherman Act against it would be "an
unauthorized interference by the national government" with intrastate
commerce.'5 9 To this the Court replied, "This suggestion does not at all
impress us.' ' 16 0 Justice Harlan's elaboration on this terse remark explains the
interaction between the Sherman Act and the states' power over their
economies:
The regulation or control of purely domestic commerce of a State is,
of course, with the State, and Congress has no direct power over it so
long as what is done by the State does not interfere with the
operations of the General Government, or any legal enactment of
Congress. A State, if it chooses so to do, may even submit to the
existence of combinations within its limits that restrain its internal
trade. But neither a state corporation nor its stockholders can...
interfere with the complete enforcement of any rule lawfully devised
by Congress for the conduct of commerce among the States or with
foreign nations; for, as we have seen, interstate and international
commerce is by the Constitution under the control of Congress, and
it belongs to the legislative department of the Government to prescribe
rules for the conduct of that commerce. If it were otherwise, the
declaration in the Constitution of its supremacy, and of the supremacy
as well of the laws made in pursuance of its provisions, was a waste
of words .... We repeat that no State can endow any of its
corporations, or any combination of its citizens, with authority to
restrain interstate or international commerce, or to disobey the
national will as manifested in legal enactments of Congress.' 6'
From this it is clear that, were all state action immune to Sherman Act
challenge, the states could effectively render federal antitrust law a nullity.
State laws that aim merely to shield illegal private conduct are therefore
subject to preemption by the Act.

158.
159.
160.
161.

193 U.S. 197 (1904).
Id. at 332.
Id.
Id. at 349-50.
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The alternative approach to invalidating state regulation of agent contact
with *student athletes involves finding that the states, in passing contactrestricting statutes, are not acting in their sovereign capacities as required by
Parker, but instead are acting as participants in a combination to restrain
interstate commerce. The Parker Court's citation of Union Pacific Railroad
Co. v. United States 62 provides an example by way of analogy. Union
Pacific Railroad Company persuaded Kansas City, Kansas, officials to
construct a new railroad terminal on its line so that it could enjoy an advantage
' 63
over its competitors worth "several hundred thousand dollars annually."'
The idea was to divert traffic from the terminal in Kansas City, Missouri, to
Kansas City, Kansas, and thus to Union Pacific. The plan contemplated the
city's ownership of the terminal, as this made possible certain tax advantages
as well as a federal grant for construction. To persuade prospective tenants to
relocate from Missouri, the city offered concessions and free rents in excess
of the cost of moving. The Supreme Court held the city's action violated the
Elkins Act,t64 which prohibited rebates, concessions, and discrimination in
the rates charged for transporting goods by rail.' 65 Like the Sherman Act, the
Elkins Act was a congressional regulation of interstate commerce, and the
Court held the city could not violate it for profit. 66 The Parker Court's
reference to Union Pacific therefore indicates that if a state participates in a
conspiracy to restrain interstate commerce so as to enhance its treasury, it
might not be entitled to assert its immunity from federal antitrust legislation.
2. States as Enforcers of PrivateAnticompetitive Action
The first step in a "state action immunity" analysis is identifying the
character of the restraint at issue. While Parker indicates that states cannot
bestow antitrust immunity upon the anticompetitive schemes of private parties,
it does not offer any guidance in determining whether a combination or
agreement represents illegal private action or permissible state action. The
distinction is not as obvious as it might seem for the simple reason that every
state regulation displacing free-market competition will necessarily benefit
some private actors at the expense of others. The defendants in Olsen, for
example, had the pilot fees they could charge their customers fixed by the
Texas legislature and were assured that unlicensed individuals could not
162. 313 U.S. 450 (1941).
163. Id. at 461.
164. Elkins Act, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847 (1903) (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. §§ 11703,
11902-11903, 11915-11916 (1988)).
165. Union Pacific, 313 U.S. at 464-74.
166. Id. In a later Supreme Court opinion considering Union Pacific in the context of state action
immunity, Justice Brennan wrote: "It is significant that the cities' [sic] argument was rejected in the context
of the antirebate provisions of the Elkins Act, a statute which essentially is an antitrust provision ......
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 401-02 n.19 (1978).
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compete for the business. Similarly, California's Agricultural Prorate
Commission sought to prevent the appellee in Parkerfrom fulfilling contracts
he had made to sell his raisins at a price different from that fixed by the state.
This obviously benefited Parker's competitors.
The case of Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp.167 gave the
Court its first occasion to indicate the limits of state action immunity. The
controversy centered on the validity of a Louisiana statute that forbade any
retailer to sell liquor below the price established by any fair-trade contract (an
agreement establishing a minimum resale price) of which the retailer was
aware even if it was not a party to the agreement. The respondents, gin and
whiskey distributors, sued Schwegmann Brothers, a New Orleans retailer that
refused to sign a fair-trade contract, to prevent it from selling below the prices
fixed by contracts with other retailers. Reasoning that states could not compel
adherence to privately set prices, the Court held that Louisiana had overstepped
the bounds of state action immunity and invalidated the statute: "[W]hen a
state compels retailers to follow a parallel price policy, it demands private
conduct which the Sherman Act forbids."'68
More recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has engendered a simple test
that further clarifies the matter. The roots of the test are found in Bates v. State
Bar,'69 a case arising from a challenge to the Arizona Supreme Court's
prohibition on attorney advertising, which it adopted from the American Bar
Association's Code of Professional Responsibility. The Court held that the
advertising ban was immune from antitrust challenge because the policy was
"the affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court."'"7 In other words,
the determinative factor was that, rather than having agreed not to advertise,
the lawyers had been told by the state that they could not. That the same
harmful effects flowed from the state's directive as would from a conspiracy
among lawyers to restrict competition was irrelevant. The question of
immunity is one of the state's power, not the wisdom of its policies.' 7' The
Bates Court noted, "[W]e deem it significant that the state policy is so clearly
72
and affirmatively expressed and that the State's supervision is so active."'1
Following a three-year gestation period, the decision in CaliforniaRetail
Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. '7 pronounced those two
significant considerations-a clearly expressed policy and active state
supervision-the standards by which to determine whether state action

167. 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
168. Id. at 389 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943)).
169. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
170. Id. at 360. The Court struck down the advertising ban on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 384.
171. "[I]t
is not our task to pass upon the social utility or political wisdom of price-fixing agreements."
Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1990).
172. 433 U.S. at 362.
173. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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immunity insulates a challenged regulation from antitrust attack. 74 Midcai
Aluminum sued to enjoin enforcement of California's wine-pricing program.
The program required wineries to file executed fair-trade contracts with the
state. Wholesalers had to file price schedules for wines whose prices were not
fixed by fair-trade contracts. A distributor selling wine below the filed prices
could be fined or have its license suspended or revoked. The program thus
enabled distributors or producers to fix prices for all wines, regardless of their
origin or destination, with the state acting as enforcer of their determinations.
Finding that the state legislature had clearly articulated a policy of allowing
resale price maintenance in the wine trade, the Court turned its attention to
examining the state's supervision over the program:
The State simply authorizes price setting and enforces the prices
established by private parties. The State neither establishes prices nor
reviews the reasonableness of the price schedules; nor does it regulate
the terms of fair trade contracts. The State does not monitor market
conditions or engage in any "pointed reexamination" of the program.
The national policy in favor of competition cannot be thwarted by
casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement
over what is
' 75
essentially a private price-fixing arrangement."'
A unanimous Court thus sounded the death knell for California's winepricing program and announced the birth of a two-prong judicial test: State
action immunity obtains only when a state (1) expresses clearly and
affirmatively an intention to supplant competition with regulation in some
sector of the economy and (2) actively supervises the regulated sector. The
Midcal test, which was affirmed on similar facts in 324 Liquor Corp. v.
Duffy176 and later cases, continues to be the measure of whether regulations
providing for state enforcement of private marketing decisions enjoy Parker
immunity. The national policy favoring competition requires that the test be
strictly administered: "For States which do choose to displace the free market
with regulation, our insistence on real compliance with both parts of the
Midcal test will serve to make clear that the State is responsible for the price
fixing it has sanctioned and undertaken to control.'

'177

There can be little doubt that the contact-restricting statutes restrain
interstate commerce by enforcing private agreements and thus come within the

174. Id. at 105.
175. Id. at 105-06 (footnote omitted).
176. 479 U.S. 335 (1987). The Court invalidated a New York statute requiring liquor retailers to
charge at least 112% of the bottle prices filed by wholesalers with the State Liquor Authority. Justice
O'Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented on Twenty-First Amendment grounds. All of the Justices
apparently agreed that "the federal antitrust laws pre-empt state laws authorizing or compelling private
parties to engage in anticompetitive behavior." Id. at 346 n.8.
177. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992).
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ambit of the Sherman Act. Intercollegiate sports are in interstate
commerce, 178 and the NCAA is a combination of competitors whose
eligibility rules, one of which is enforced by the statutes, restrain interstate
commerce, though not unreasonably. By passing these laws, the states have
lent their police power to the purpose of enforcing an NCAA rule against
parties over whom the NCAA has no authority. Indeed, while all twenty-one
contact-restricting statutes have this effect, several of them explicitly state that
79
causing a student athlete to violate an NCAA rule is a crime.
One might wonder, though, how these statutes can offend the Act if the
NCAA no-agent rule that they enforce does not. Judge Easterbrook answered
this question in United States v. Walters.'80 Rejecting the charge that Norby
Walters's recruitment of athletes constituted mail fraud, Easterbrook wrote:
The NCAA depresses athletes' income-restricting payments to the
value of tuition, room, and board, while receiving services of
substantially greater worth. The NCAA treats this as desirable
preservation of amateur sports; a more jaundiced eye would see it as
the use of monopsony power to obtain athletes' services for less than
the competitive market price .... For current purposes it matters not
whether the NCAA actually monopsonizes the marketfor players; the
point of this discussion is that the prosecutor's theory makes criminals
of those who consciously cheat on the rules of a private organization,
even if that organization is a cartel. We pursue this point because any
theory that makes criminals of cheaters raises a redflag.
Cheaters are not self-conscious champions of the public weal.
They are in it for profit, as rapacious and mendacious as those who
hope to collect monopoly rents. Maybe more; often members of
cartels believe that monopoly serves the public interest, and they take
their stand on the platform of business ethics, while cheaters' glasses
have been washed with cynical acid. Only Adam Smith's invisible
hand turns their self-seeking activities to public benefit. It is cause for
regret if prosecutors, assuming that persons with low regard for
honesty must be villains, use the criminal8 laws to suppress the
competitive process that undermines cartels.' '
This reasoning applies with equal force to the contact-restricting
statutes. 2 Because the statutes outlaw economic activity that gives athletes
178. See, e.g., NCAA v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1543 (1994);
NCAA v. Roberts, No. 94-40413-WS, 1994 WL 750585 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 8, 1994).
179. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-26-7 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 468.4562(2) (West 1996); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 9A.8 (West 1995); MIss. CODE ANN. § 73-41-7(c) (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 398.085
(Michie 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-7-2103 (1994); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8871, § 7(d) (West
Supp. 1996).
180. 997 F.2d 1219 (7th Cir. 1993).
181. Id. at 1225 (emphases added) (citation omitted).
182. Judge Easterbrook's argument is particularly compelling considering that he not only is a
recognized authority on antitrust law, but also argued the NCAA's case in NCAA v. Board of Regents of
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
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hoping to play professional football an alternative to the NCAA's offer of
tuition, room, and board, they raise a "red flag" signaling possible conflict with
the Sherman Act. The legality of the NCAA rules themselves is entirely beside
the point. It is also worth noting that the contact-restricting statutes do not
enjoy the procompetitive justifications that have saved the NCAA rules from
Sherman Act invalidation. They are neither necessary for conducting
intercollegiate sports nor tailored to further the primacy of educational pursuits
among student athletes. In fact, the statutes undermine these NCAA goals by
protecting universities that admit students based solely on athletic ability from
the likely consequences of such decisions. The Midcal test therefore must be
applied to determine whether the statutes are protected from invalidation under
the Act by state action immunity.
Failure of either prong of the Midcal test is sufficient to invalidate a
challenged statute. 83 The first prong of the test requires that a challenged
regulation be made pursuant to an affirmatively expressed state policy "to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service."' 4 As
Bates and Midcal indicate, the requirement of this first prong is easily met. Its
only purpose is to ascertain a deliberate legislative intent to replace
85
competition with regulation.
Motivating the contact-restricting statutes is the perceived need to
eliminate competition from sports agents for commitments from student
athletes.86 Because there is nothing inherently unethical or unprofessional
about student athlete contact with sports agents-only the NCAA's no-agent
rule that casts such business relations in an unfavorable light-the true policy
underlying the statutes must be one of avoiding or mitigating the penalties the
NCAA imposes on universities. While the wisdom of dedicating public
resources to the attainment of this end is questionable, it is sufficient for the
Midcal test that a government policy be identified, not that it be soundly
reasoned. Like the advertising prohibition challenged in Bates and the winepricing policy invalidated in Midcal, the contact-restricting statutes satisfy the
first requirement for state action immunity. They "reflect a clear articulation
87
of the State's policy with regard to professional behavior."'
The contact-restricting statutes, however, fail the second prong of the
Midcal test. "[T]he [state supervision] analysis asks whether the State has
played a substantial role in determining the specifics of the economic
policy.' 88 It might be argued that giving legal effect to the NCAA's no-

183. See Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100 (1988); California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal
Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105 (1980).
184. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 413 (1978).
185. See id. at 393-94.
186. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
187. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 362 (1977).
188. Federal Trade Comm'n v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992).
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agent rule is no different than the Arizona Supreme Court's giving legal effect
to the American Bar Association's ban on advertising in Bates, but this
analogy is fallacious. The no-agent rule is not a proscription against sports
agent conduct or even student athlete conduct. Its purpose is to ensure that
member universities recruit only amateur student athletes who, because they
are primarily interested in a college education, have little incentive to contract
with an agent before graduating. A violation of the no-agent rule, or of any
amateurism or eligibility rule, is evidence that the institution involved is not
meeting its responsibilities as an NCAA member. While the Arizona Supreme
Court enforced the advertising ban just as the ABA intended, the contactrestricting statutes turn the NCAA's rule on its head and make sports agents
and student athletes the scapegoats for the universities.
Moreover, the Bates Court noted that the advertising restriction "was
subject to pointed re-examination by the policymaker-the Arizona Supreme
Court-in enforcement proceedings."' 89 In other words, the Arizona court
could supervise the economic effects of its rule on a case-by-case basis. The
contact-restricting statutes, however, do not provide for any examination of the
economic consequences of limiting the money student athletes can legally
receive and of reducing the competitive incentives for sports agents. The
statutes simply foreclose an area of competition for the marketing of athletic
skill that can be reopened only by subsequent acts of the legislatures,1g° and,
in fact, afford no state supervision whatsoever.
Like the regulations in Midcal and Schwegmann, these statutes contemplate
private economic control backed by the power of. state enforcement. They
merely punish those who violate privately made rules. By removing incentives
for athletes to violate the no-agent rule, the contact-restricting laws benefit
only those NCAA member institutions that choose not to honor the spirit of
the NCAA amateurism rules in their admissions decisions. The economic
consequences of this are precisely those Judge Easterbrook cautioned against
in Walters: The statutes allow a private cartel to fix the benefits offered firstrate athletes for their services while making it illegal for anyone to cheat on

189. 433 U.S. at 362.
190. That a restraint on trade can be removed through recourse to the political process does not
provide the requisite state supervision necessary for state action immunity:
[Tihat argument cuts far too broadly; the same' argument may be made regarding
anticompetitive activity in which any corporation engages. Mulcted consumers and unfairly
displaced competitors may always seek redress through the political process. In enacting the
Sherman Act, however, Congress mandated competition as the polestar by which all must be
guided in ordering their business affairs. It did not leave this fundamental national policy to the
vagaries of the political process, but established a broad policy, to be administered by neutral
courts, which would guarantee every enterprise the right to exercise "whatever economic muscle
it can muster," without regard to the amount of influence it might have with local or state
legislatures.
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 406-07 (1978) (quoting United States
v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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the arrangement.' 9' The ability of the nation's most skilled young football
players to market their talents in the manner most advantageous to them is thus
sacrificed to the interests of the universities, which is to say that interstate
commerce is unreasonably restrained. The Sherman Act prevents states from
coercing adherence to a privately created price fix in this manner.
The parallel between this situation and that presented by Schwegmann
cannot be overly emphasized. In that case, liquor producers were free to make
fair-trade contracts with willing retailers. Similarly, NCAA member institutions
are free to field students willing to attend their universities and colleges. The
Supreme Court ruled in Schwegmann that the state could not use its power to
force the liquor producers' prices on retailers who preferred to set their own.
In the same way, the states cannot force athletes who find it advantageous to
violate NCAA rules to settle for what the universities agree to offer (the
opportunity to display their talents and arguably the chance to earn a degree)
or to prevent agents from making competing offers. The contact-restricting
statutes restrict competition, undermine the enforcement of NCAA rules by
protecting members that do not properly screen prospective student athletes,
and, most importantly, inflict harsh penalties on people guilty of nothing other
than aggressively pursuing their livelihood. The Sherman Act guarantees every
economic actor in the nation the chance to do just that. 19 2 It follows that
these statutes are not protected by state action immunity and are invalid under
the Sherman Act.
3. States as Participantsin Conspiracies to Restrain Trade
The alternate ground for invalidating the contact-restricting statutes under
the Sherman Act derives from the question left unanswered in Parker:whether
state action immunity applies when a state participates in a private combination
to restrain trade. That issue was visited by the Court in Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar. 93 The controversy in that case centered on a schedule of
minimum fees to be charged for legal services published by the Fairfax County
Bar Association, a private organization. The Virginia State Bar, an agency of
the Virginia Supreme Court, enforced the fee schedule by threatening
disciplinary action against attorneys charging less than the established fees.
Unable to find an attorney willing to charge less than the published fees,
petitioners alleged a violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act against both
organizations. The state bar claimed its enforcement was protected by Parker
immunity. The county bar association claimed that because it was "prompted"
to publish the schedule by the state agency, it too was immune.
191. See also Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
192. See Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610.
193. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
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The Court held that neither organization's conduct was protected by state
action immunity and invalidated the price schedules and their enforcement.
Because the Virginia Supreme Court had not even arguably directed its state
bar to enforce a minimum fee schedule, the bar's members had exceeded the
authority delegated to them by the state. The Court proceeded to explain in
dicta that state action immunity does not apply to regulations made by a state
when it acts as a participant in interstate commerce:
The fact that the State Bar is a state agency for some limited purposes
does not create an antitrust shield that allows it to foster
anticompetitive practices for the benefit of its members. The State
Bar, by providing that deviation from County Bar minimum fees may
lead to disciplinary action, has voluntarily joined in what is essentially
a private anticompetitive activity, and in that posture cannot claim it
is beyond the reach of the Sherman Act.194
Unlike Bates and Midcal, which both involved state-ordered and -enforced
restrictions on competition, Goldfarbinvolved only state enforcement of prices
fixed by a private organization of competitors.9 While heightened state
supervision could have saved California's wine-pricing program and did save
Arizona's attorney-advertising ban from antitrust condemnation, Union Pacific
and Goldfarb point to a different conclusion when the state teams up with
private actors to make both the private actors and the state more profitable.
Just as Kansas City, Kansas, participated in Union Pacific Railroad's plan to
divert traffic from Missouri because the city would profit economically, the
state bar association joined the price fix in Goldfarb because its members stood
to benefit from the anticompetitive scheme. That the goal of the arrangement
was to extract higher fees for attorneys did not go unnoticed by the Court:
"The reason for adopting the fee schedule does not appear to have been wholly
altruistic. The first sentence in respondent State Bar's 1962 Minimum Fee
Schedule Report states: 'The lawyers have slowly, but surely, been committing
economic suicide as a profession."" 96 Thus, Goldfarb amounts to a case of
a state agency enforcing rules promulgated by a private cartel for the sole
purpose of increasing the wealth of the state or, more accurately, that of state

194. Id. at 791-92 (citations and footnotes omitted).
195. See id. at 776. Midcaldid not raise the issue of horizontal price fixing (where direct competitors
agree on the price to be charged) except to observe that the wine-pricing program "frequently resulted" in
such agreements. See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 101. The controversy centered instead on the vertical price fixing
(where producers, wholesalers, or distributors force their buyers to resell the product at a fixed price) aspect
of the program. That petitioner California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, an intervenor in the case,
brought the appeal does not indicate a cartel among retailers. The retailers had no power to set prices under
the program but were intended to be its chief beneficiaries--one of the program's aims was to protect small
retailers from competition with larger ones. Id. at 112-13.
196. Goldfarb, 421 U.S. at 786 n.16 (citation omitted).
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officials.197 "Goldfarb therefore made it clear that, for the purposes of the
Parker doctrine not every act of a state agency is that of the State as
sovereign."' 98
Jefferson County Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Abbott Laboratories also
involved the application of a federal antitrust statute, the Robinson-Patman
Act,'99 to state action. The Robinson-Patman Act makes it illegal to sell or
purchase anything in interstate commerce at prices not available to other
buyers "where the effect ...may be substantially to lessen competition or tend
to create a monopoly.'2"" The University of Alabama, a public university
operating two pharmacies at an affiliated hospital, obtained prescription drugs
at prices available only to government agencies and resold them in competition
with private pharmacies. Assuming that Congress did not intend the RobinsonPatman Act to apply to purchases made for use by governments, the Court
nonetheless held that it did apply when states compete with private
retailers:20' "It is too late in the day to suggest that Congress cannot regulate
States under its Commerce Clause powers when they are engaged in
proprietary activities."2 2
Two years later, the Court in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority abandoned the distinction between sovereign and proprietary
government actions in Commerce Clause cases. 20 3 Despite this holding, the
"market participant exception" persists in Commerce Clause jurisprudence.2 4
As a matter of logic, because federal antitrust laws are promulgated under
Congress's Commerce Clause power, the market participant exception must

197. It is useful here to clarify a slight conceptual ambiguity. All the members of the county bar were
also members of the state bar, so the same people who were setting prices were also enforcing the cartel.
Rather than picturing the attorneys as wearing two hats-a "private actor" hat and an "officer of the court"
hat-it is perhaps simpler to imagine the two organizations as having no overlap in membership.
Alternatively, one can suppose that some other state agency (such as the income tax collector) was
enforcing the arrangement (expecting to reap higher taxes from attorneys earning higher fees). The point
is the same: The state participated in the price-fixing scheme, and its officials stood to benefit from it.
198. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 410 (1978).
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1994).
200. Id. § 13(a), 13(0.
201. 460 U.S. 150, 154 (1983).
202. Id. at 154 n.6.
203. 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985). The Court held:
[N]either the governmental/proprietary distinction nor any other that purports to separate out
important governmental functions can be faithful to the role of federalism in a democratic
society.... We therefore now reject, as unsound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule
of state immunity from federal regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a
particular government function is "integral" or "traditional."
Id. at 545-47.
The same distinction had previously been abandoned in cases concerning state immunity from federal
taxation. See New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 583-84 (1946).
204. See, e.g., Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 459 (1992); New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486
U.S. 269, 277 (1988); Wisconsin Dep't of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
289 (1986).
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remain viable in the antitrust field as well. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advertising, Inc. 205 indicates as much:
The rationale of Parkerwas that, in light of our national commitment
to federalism, the general language of the Sherman Act should not be
interpreted to prohibit anticompetitive actions by the States in their
governmental capacities as sovereign regulators.... [T]his immunity

does not necessarily obtain where the State acts not in a regulatory
capacity but as a commercial participant in a given market. That is
evident from the citation of Union Pacific R. Co. v. United States,
which held unlawful under the Elkins Act certain rebates and
concessions made by Kansas City, Kansas, in its capacity as the
owner and operator of a wholesale produce market that was integrated
with railroad facilities. 0 6
Not surprisingly, confusion persists among the lower courts over whether
the market participant exception has a role in antitrust law. In a case decided
between Garciaand Omni, a Tenth Circuit panel stated: "It appears to us that
the distinction between proprietary and governmental functions has not been
pursued in recent Supreme Court opinions."2 7 Relying on the Court's
noncommittal approach to the market participant exception in Omni,20 8 the
Eighth Circuit concluded: "As yet ....the market participant exception is
merely a suggestion and is not a rule of law."20 9 Taking its cue from these
courts, the Southern District of Indiana also rejected the market participant
exception. In a case involving antitrust claims arising from patent misuse
allegations against the University of California, a public university, that court
stated: "[E]ven were we inclined to apply a market participant exception to
Parker immunity, the facts of this particular case would not warrant its
application. We, however, join the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in their refusal
to recognize any such exception.2 1 l In an appeal arising from the same
litigation, however, the Federal Circuit acknowledged the viability of the
market participant exception."'

There is no sound legal basis for a federal court to refuse to apply the
market participant exception in Parker immunity cases. Garcia has not

205. 499 U.S. 365 (1991).
206. Id. at 374-75 (citation omitted).
207. Allright Colorado, Inc. v. City & County of Denver, 937 F.2d 1502, 1510 n.] 1 (10th Cir. 1991).
208. The court relied on the passage quoted in the text accompanying note 206 and on this passage:
"we reiterate that, with the possible market participant exception, any action that qualifies as state action
is 'ipsofacto... exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws.' This does not mean, of course, that the
States may exempt private action from the scope of the Sherman Act .... Omni, 499 U.S. at 379 (quoting
Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 (1984)) (citation omitted).
209. Paragould Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Paragould, Ark., 930 F2d 1310, 1312-13 (8th Cir. 1991).
210. In re Recombinant DNA Technology Patent & Contract Litig., 874 F. Supp. 904, 912 (S.D. Ind.
1994).
211. See Genentech, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F2d 931, 948-49 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
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prevented its continued use even in Commerce Clause cases, 212 so there is
no reason why the exception should be disregarded in antitrust cases. Omni
negates any contrary contention, and Jefferson County and Union Pacific show
that the exception is in fact law and not "merely a suggestion."
The twenty-one states with contact-restricting statutes participate in the
market for college sports and consequently in the market for student
athletes.1 3 Each of these states operates universities involved in NCAA
Division I sports (including football)214 and stands to benefit economically
from laws designed "to squeeze out of their players one or two more years of
service." 21 5 Sports agents do not compete with NCAA member institutions
in the same way that the University of Alabama pharmacies competed with
private pharmacies in Jefferson County. Rather than competing directly, agents
compete by offering an alternative to the NCAA's standardized compensation.
By agreeing to give athletes no more than tuition, room, and board and to
disqualify athletes who accept additional benefits from any source, NCAA
members are vulnerable to agents offering student athletes an "advance"
against income they expect the athletes to earn professionally.
The contact-restricting statutes are nothing more than a means to prevent
this competition from decreasing the revenue generated by public university
football teams. That this is the true motivation behind the laws appears to be
less than a secret. Asked why it is necessary to incarcerate agents who sign
student athletes, Florida legislator James King, the sponsor of Florida's
revamped sports agents statute, said, "Because they're criminals! If their action
results in an institution being punished by the NCAA or in an athlete's
216
ineligibility, that's really stealing from the coffers of the state of Florida."
The year after Alabama passed its contact-restricting statute, Alabama Assistant
Attorney General Don Valeska expressed the same concern: "Anytime you
have sports agents costing universities a quarter of a million dollars, just by
waving cash under the face of a kid, you don't have a political problem,

212. See supra text accompanying note 204.
213. See Banks v. NCAA, 977 F.2d 1081, 1095-96 (7th Cir. 1992) (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and
dissenting in part) ("NCAA member colleges are the purchasers of labor in this market, and the players are
the suppliers. The players agree to compete in football games sponsored by the colleges, games that
typically gamer the colleges a profit, in exchange for tuition, room, board, and other benefits."); see also
United States v. Walters, 997 F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The NCAA depresses athletes'
income-restricting payments to the value of tuition, room, and board, while receiving services of
substantially greater worth.").
214. Examples of Division I public universities in these states include: University of Alabama,
University of Southern California, Florida State University, University of Georgia, University of Indiana,
University of Iowa, University of Kentucky, Louisiana State University, University of Maryland, University
of Michigan, University of Minnesota, Mississippi State University, University of Nevada, North Carolina
State University, Ohio State University, University of Oklahoma, Pennsylvania State University, University
of South Carolina, University of Tennessee, Texas A&M University, and University of Washington.
215. Banks, 977 F.2d at 1095 (Flaum, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
216. Telephone Interview with Representative James King, Florida House of Representatives (Feb. 14,
1995).
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you've got a criminal problem." 217 So, because competing with sports agents
for the loyalty of student athletes would entail either dropping all pretenses at
amateurism or recruiting only true "student athletes"-either of which would
almost certainly make college football less interesting to fans and consequently
less profitable for state universities 2M--these states and nineteen others have
simply outlawed the competition.
Viewed in light of the market participant exception, the ruthless behavior
leading to the contact-restricting statutes becomes clear: State U., a public
university and NCAA member university on a quest to achieve enhanced
prominence, prestige, and revenue by winning football games, recruits players
for whom sport is more than an avocation. Some of these athletes, who may
never have gone to college if there were any other way into professional
football, are caught violating the no-agent rule. University administrators feign
shock and outrage before the media, seeming totally at a loss as to how such
corruption arrived on their campus, just as those from Florida State did after
Sports Illustrateduncovered the Foot Locker scandal. The NCAA slaps State
U. with penalties for fielding ineligible athletes. Fans are disappointed all
across the state over State U.'s consequent diminished ability to recruit the best
athletes and win games. In the capital, legislators disappointed with State U.'s
diminished ability to fill stadium seats and collect proceeds from television
appearances, including postseason tournament competition, crack down on
those sports agents who rained on State U.'s bowl-game victory parade. Sports
agents are declared outlaws for "corrupting" State U.'s cheap labor. Because
the NCAA is a private actor,2 19 this is undoubtedly a case of "a state...
in a private agreement or. combination by others for
becoming a participant
220
trade.
of
restraint
V. CONCLUSION

Outlawing legitimate business conduct because it lures away athletes worth
a good deal of money to universities is not a manifestation of state action
deemed immune from antitrust condemnation under the rule of Parker v.
Brown. The contact-restricting statutes exist to insulate universities from the
very penalties they have assented to accept as NCAA members and to help
some NCAA member institutions maintain profitable control over the only
forum leading to a professional football career. The laws provide for state
enforcement of a privately made rule, but not for any review of or control over
its economic consequences. Furthermore, as owners of public universities, the
217. Fred Grimm, Alabana Wants ErrantSports Agents Jailed,MIAMI HERALD, Apr. 27, 1988, at IA,
9A.
218. See NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984).
219. See NCAA v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 198 (1988).
220. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52 (1943).
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states enforcing the no-agent rule with criminal penalties enjoy a considerable
pecuniary stake in preventing top athletes from losing their eligibility to
compete in NCAA contests. The contact-restricting statutes thus fail to meet
the requirements for Parker immunity and unreasonably restrain interstate
commerce. They are therefore invalid under the Sherman Act.
In addition, they serve no end that the universities could not easily achieve
without resort to incarceration. By recruiting athletes prone to breaking NCAA
rules, state university officials evince the very profiteering that they condemn
in agents and athletes. To say only that this is hypocritical is to ignore the
larger issue:
Individuals employed by or associated with member institutions for
the administration, the conduct or the coaching of intercollegiate
athletics are, in the final analysis, teachers of young people. Their
responsibility is an affirmative one, and they must do more than avoid
improper conduct or questionable acts. Their own moral values must
be so certain and positive that those younger and more pliable will be
influenced by a fine example. Much more is expected of them than of
the less critically placed citizen.22'

221. NCAA MANUAL, supra note 16, § 19.01.2. at 343.

